BEYOND TOLERANCE:
RADICAL DIALOGUE IN AN ERA OF EXPANDING RELIGION*
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It is commonplace in our everyday language as religious educators to begin with the assumption that we live in a pluralistic world. Simply naming pluralism as a global reality, however, does not help us clarify how we shall live together in our diversity. Wars, those reported by CNN and those ignored by it, rage around the world. From Indonesia to Uganda to Mexico to Kosovo to Atlanta, there is killing and fear and oppression in the Global City. Unjust violence based on deep ethnic and racial hatred, violence based on religious difference and on memories of previous religious hate and fear, violence based on political and economic diversity, violence based on sex and gender, violence against the whole natural earth--violence fills our experience of what it means to be human in a pluralistic world community.

Force, that thing Simone Weil described as "that x that turns anybody who is subjected to it into a thing," seems at loose in the entire earth. Not even life within our specific religious communities is spared these patterns of distrust, of hatred, and worse. Literary critic W. R. Johnson called it "the rage to uncreate whatever is not itself." We live in a pluralistic world. How shall we live together in our diversity?

We are not the first modern generation to ask this question. Hopefully, we shall not be the last. The Enlightenment is the crucial historical event for understanding the religious education movement of the twentieth century. Its lessons about living together in a pluralistic world are ones we continue to exercise, consciously or unconsciously. Whatever else the Enlightenment was, it was a peacemaking movement. We forget today that the Thirty Years War (1618-48) was a powerful, pervasive memory for people in the West all the way up to World War I. Following the Wars of Religion after the Reformation, the Thirty Years War was a war based on religious pluralism that could not see its way to peace. In the name of God, Europe sought to destroy the "other," and exhausted itself--by the time of the Treaty of Westfalia--in violence.

The idea of tolerance that emerged out the carnage of the Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years War arose from the experiences of religious hatred and war. It is important to remember, for example, that the work of a Rene Descartes was not some esoteric treatise about epistemology, but was grounded in the earthy reality of religious failure and violence. Much of his early thinking and writing took place in a French military barracks. We today are called upon once again, in the midst of global violence, to think again about peace and life together.
Thinking again about peace and life together as a Roman Catholic, middle-aged privileged white male living and working at a graduate school in Atlanta, Georgia will be necessarily different than ways many of you might think about peace and life together. That is as it should be. Although I occupy a special place during this lecture before you, I would like you to imagine that we are all seated at a round table. I have been called upon by the group to begin the discussion of these crucial matters, nothing more or less. The issue before us as a group of passionate religious educators, peace and life together, fills the center of our circle--and gives focus to our attention. This discussion is crucial for all of us here, for this discussion is about the context of religious education in the new millennium.

I hold four basic assumptions that will frame my opening comments to this group gathered around the discussion table. First, in the words of Joan Wallach Scott, "differences may be what we have most in common. Differences are often irreducible and must be accepted as such." Second, a multicultural and multiconfessional understanding of community are essential for religious educators of the twenty-first century. Third, the liberal understanding of tolerance that traces its roots back to the Enlightenment is in itself inadequate as a basis for religious educational praxis within a multicultural and multiconfessional community context--although we give much thanks and appreciation to those of the Enlightenment who thought deeply about the matters before us. And last, religious educators must move beyond the traditional liberal understanding of tolerance in order to embody the diversities increasingly inherent in life-filled religious communities characterized by radical dialogue and expanding religion. This means that we are searching for a new language beyond tolerance.

**Differences May Be What We Have Most in Common**

Joan Wallach Scott is a Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study. Reflecting on the nature of the modern university, Scott concludes

- Community is a strategically organized set of relationships, not a thing or an inner essence that exists prior to its articulation.
- Differences may be what we have most in common. Differences are often irreducible and must be accepted as such.
- Differences are relational and these relationships are hierarchical. The differentials of power on which they are based are constantly contested. Consensus, if it is achieved, is not enduring.
- Conflict and contest are therefore inherent in communities of difference. The play of difference is unavoidable and its is not a game; it is both the basis for, and the necessarily destabilizing aspect of, community.

For many of us in religious education, this is a very new and different way of understanding what counts as community in the university--or anywhere else. I will contend that while Scott was reflecting on the university *qua* university, the university is an adequate metaphorical starting place for beginning to think about our varied communities within a pluralistic world. As an organized set of relationships, it is inevitable for differences to emerge as issues affecting the community will arise.

It would be a mistake to conclude that differences arise only between communities, and not within communities themselves. While communities produce identifiable cultures, diversity continues to be an
attribute even with stable communal cultural systems. Anthropologist Ann Swidler suggests that during times of transition or confusion, diversity is intensified, more noticeable. She writes

Bursts of ideological activism occur in periods when competing ways of organizing action are developing or contending for dominance. People formulate, flesh out, and put into practice new habits of action. In such situations, culture may indeed be said to directly shape action.7

To suggest that differences arise powerfully during times of change or transition within (or between) groups does not imply that differences do not exist during times of relative stability. Scott is very helpful here in observing that consensus may be achieved, but consensus is never enduring. It may be difficult to accept that "differences are relational and these relationships are hierarchical." As a feminist social scientist, Scott is concerned about power relations--especially the intersection of power and difference. Said another way, the play of difference is a play of power, in which consensus does not necessary connote unanimity, but partage.8 Scott explains that

\textit{Partage} means both to divide and to share. \textit{Partage} is a more difficult concept than consensus, but it is also an improvement. It accepts difference as a condition of our lives and suggests ways we might well live with it.9

\textit{Partage} leaves open the possibility of staying in relation even when differences are irreducible. While irreducible differences may remain just that--irreducible--these differences can form the basis for a kind of play that both maintains difference and moves to a shared new insight, without dissolving the original differences.

This paradox of affirming both irreducible differences and moving to a shared new insight was described by therapist Charles Gerkin as "hermeneutical play." Gerkin wrote:

Gadmer proposes that the truly new understanding for both partners in a dialogue (and for both interpreter and a text) emerges when the horizons of each partner have so merged that the dialogue shifts into another level of interaction best understood as a kind of play. Hermeneutical play…may be seen as providing a kind of transitional space within which new imaginative interpretations may take form that acknowledge and conform to a larger and richer perception of the reality of a situation than either counselor had before possessed.10

Whether or not partage moves to hermeneutical play, it is not the telos of community. To stay in conversation, to hear deeply the areas of irreducible difference and paradox, to recognize the relation of power and difference, and to know consensus--fleeting as it is--does not imply "giving in" is a prerequisite for hermeneutical play. Hermeneutical play is hard, imaginative work.

When Scott asserts that the "play of difference is unavoidable and it is not a game," I believe she is saying that the play of difference ought not be taken lightly. For in a real way, communities embody the notion of "game."11 There are rules for conversation and action that are negotiated, and which form culture. Culture has been defined by Swidler as "symbolic vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well as informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories, and
rituals of daily life." Culture is the embodiment of the thoughtful play of difference that "is both the basis for, and the necessary destabilizing aspect of, community."

A Multicultural and Multiconfessional Community

If diversity is what communities have most in common, even within those communities where at first glance there is consensus, what about religion and culture within these communities? When I begin to think about religion and diversity, I return to the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz. In one of his earlier books, The Interpretation of Cultures, Geertz defines religion in this way:

a religion is:

(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men {sic} by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.

You will notice that this definition of religion is extremely similar to the definition of culture given by Ann Swidler. Culture and religion do go hand-in-glove. Culture and religion are not identical, but they are inseparable. Religious groups create culture, and culture is formed and re-formed by its relation to religion. Geertz is once again helpful in describing the ways various systems of meaning operate within culture. Art, common sense, religion, and ideology, for example, are systems of meaning within culture that shape cultural "partage."

For religious educators, the cultural systems of religion and ideology are especially important. For Geertz, ideology (following the work of Fallers) refers "to that part of culture which is actively concerned with the establishment and defense of patterns of belief and value." Ideology is a fundamentally socially conservative cultural system that resists innovation and change. When consensus in a community of diversity becomes rigid, ideology is not far behind. Literary theorist Pierre Macherey summarizes the power and limits of ideology in his book A Theory of Literary Production.

Ideology is a false totality because it has not appointed its own limits. Ideology has received these limits, but it exists solely in order to forget that moment of origin. These abiding limits, which are both permanent and permanently latent, are the source of that dissonance which structures all ideology: the dissonance between its explicit openness and its implicit closure....

Like a planet revolving around an absent sun, an ideology is made of what it does not mention; its exists because there are things which must not be spoken of....

It is not difficult to imagine in our times how ideology often turns to religion for social affirmation. The words "Gott mit Uns," God with Us, appeared on the belt buckles of Nazi troops. Nor is it difficult for us to imagine in our times how religion often embraces popular ideology to give itself a sense of identity and social place with social power. In its inherently duplicitous nature, presenting itself as open to critique and change—yet in practice rejecting all that would call for change, ideology and the understanding of partage suggested by Joan Wallach Scott, could not be more distinct.
If Scott is correct, and I believe she is, that what we have most in common in community is our diversity, then communities of religion that embrace the ethical vision of "the play of difference" are called in their forms and practices of intentional community to embody "the action of a radical criticism." In the words of Gregory Baum, such an understanding of religion is "utopian." Baum writes

Religion...is ideological if it legitimates the existing social order, defends the dominant values, enhances the authority of the dominant class, and creates an imagination suggesting that society is stable and perdures. By contrast, religion is utopian if it reveals the ills of the present social order, inverts the dominant values of society, undermines the authority of the ruling groups, and makes people expect the downfall of the present system...Utopias envisage a qualitative transformation of the conditions of human life. Such utopias may be revolutionary or evolutionary.18

Religion as an utopian cultural system requires the play of diversity within specific religious communities, as well as the play of diversity between different religious communities that move within different cultural systems. Multiculturalism is not an option for the utopian religious community, it is its lifeblood. Multiconfessional networks of difference which arise from a diversity of cultural locations are essential for communal life characterized by partage. I first heard the term "multiconfessional" in a 1999 radio news broadcast from Macedonia, in which a governmental official was expressing the deep wish for peace together within a context of different, and often competing, religious, political, and/or ideological views. I value the term for its hopeful approach to pluralism, as well as its openness to dialogue (confess publicly), repentance (confession), and diversity (multi).

If, then, the play of difference is to characterize our utopian communities, those utopian religious communities must be characterized in their daily life and work as mutliconfessional and multicultural. The implications of this proposal for religious education praxis are many and far reaching. Two of the major implications are the understanding of difference as the defining characteristic of community, and religious community as a utopian community that seeks intentionally to give critique to ideological accommodation. With this in mind, we now turn to a dominant ideological construct within the United States, as well as a growing number of nations throughout the world, that of "tolerance."

Tolerance in a Multiconfessional and Multicultural Context

The theme of tolerance is one of the most hotly debated areas of political science today. Yet, the field of religious education as a whole is hauntingly silent on the topic.19 As we review together some of the dominant issues at stake in this debate, we may begin to wonder how it is possible that an issue that shapes our daily political and social lives in the United States, as well as a growing number nations around the world that are embracing Western conceptions of tolerance, could be overlooked or avoided by thoughtful religious educators. What has become commonplace in our field, the lack of persistent attention to the basic political foundations of the United States, could not be further removed from the nature and identity of the liberal religious education movement in the first half of the twentieth century. Before engaging the present discussion of tolerance within the political sciences, allow me to review very briefly
the relation of liberal religious education and politics in the first half of the twentieth century in the United States.

As early as 1910, philosopher and educator John Dewey insisted that philosophy had a practical basis in politics and the "organization of a just social order." This theme was taken up by Dewey and given educational focus in such books as *Democracy and Education*, *The Motives of Men*, and *A Common Faith*. There was for Dewey an unwavering assumption of the value of democracy framing the context and process of a just social order. What might be called a desire for the democratization of society through the agency of the public school was taken up by a contemporary of Dewey, educator George S. Counts. When Counts asked in 1932, "Dare the School Build a New Social Order?" one had no doubt what the answer could be, nor that democratic values were presumed.

Whether we remember Coe, Bower, Chave, Fahs, or Elliott, it is fair to conclude that from the turn of the twentieth century through the early 1950's, philosophy and religious education were understood to be in the service of the democratization of society. The relation of politics and public education or religious education in the service of this radical social agenda was simply taken for granted. The term "tolerance" was used only rarely by these religious educators (if at all by some), because the "liberal" Progressive education movement believed so fundamentally in the righteousness of the ideal of liberal democracy.

It was presumed that the acceptance of a common good inherent in democratic thinking was not only adequate in dealing with differences, but those who did not concur were simply not pro-social. It was assumed that thinking, reflective people would see the obvious value of democratic life. To imagine people choosing against the democratic ideal was too horrific to entertain. Within this ethical vision, John Dewey could write in 1934:

> Lip service--often more than lip service--has been given to the idea of the common brotherhood of all men. But those outside the fold of the church and those who do not rely upon belief in the supernatural have been regarded as only potential brothers, still requiring adoption into the family. I cannot understand how any realization of the democratic ideal as a vital moral and spiritual ideal in human affairs is possible without surrender to the conception of the basic division to which supernatural Christianity is committed. Whether or no we are, save in some metaphorical sense, all brothers, we are at least all in the same boat traversing the same turbulent ocean. The potential religious significance of this fact is infinite.

World War II made a mess of Dewey's boat of humanity, and the turbulence of a confused and fragmented world was the topic of the 1946-1947 study of the theological and educational foundations of religious education report developed by the influential International Council of Religious Education. The study concluded, in a rather gloomy way that:

> deep cleavages fissure almost all phases of our social life, separating races, classes, religions, political parties, the age levels, labor and management, and the adherents of our competing ideologies. There is no accepted unity in life. Democracy degenerates into the clash of social groups instead of evoking a united devotion to the common good.
In a little more than a dozen years, the democratic idealism (albeit with apprehensions and warnings) of Dewey yielded to a growing mistrust of democracy as an adequate organizing principle for religious education. In fact, democracy as understood by the International Council of Religious Education had become the source of unbridled divisiveness and political chaos.

By the early 1980's the concept of liberal democracy, let alone any inherent sense of the relation of social reconstruction or tolerance had been domesticated by leaders in the religious education movement. Recall the familiar words of Thomas H. Groome in the widely read book, Christian Religious Education: Sharing Our Story and Vision:

Educational activity with pilgrims in time is a political activity. I understand political activity to be any deliberate and structured intervention in people's lives which attempts to influence how they live their lives in society.  

What is fascinating to observe in Groome is the affirmation of education's political activity without any reference whatsoever to the public debate about "democracy" or to tolerance. It is as if Groome took Dewey's passion for public life guided by a particular understanding of democracy, and replaced it with an essentially private Catholic understanding of the Kingdom of God that might have implications for public life. But it is incorrect to assume the public nature of Dewey's understanding of democracy is synonymous to Groome's understanding of the Kingdom of God.

While the work of Paulo Freire's work related to liberation and literacy could be characterized as a form of "militant democracy," and while many religious educators in the United States, including such persons as Groome, point to Freire's (and Dewey's) reconstruction and reorganization of experience, it is equally important to remember how Freire's model did not as a whole translate easily to the North American context. Pedagogies for the Non-Poor by Alice Frazer Evans, Robert A. Evans, and William Bean Kennedy was perhaps the most honest approach to this problem of "connection."  

Notice the shift of attention from Dewey to Groome, from 1910 to 1980. Dewey as philosopher and Unitarian religious educator was concerned fundamentally with the public dimensions of teaching and learning, while Groome was concerned fundamentally with the ecclesial dimensions of teaching and learning. Dewey was a responsible citizen in dialogue with the public social and political reality of the United States that included the public school, summarized in his vision of a common faith grounded in democracy. Groome was an ecumenical Roman Catholic in dialogue with Christian people about the ways God's reign might shape the praxis of specific religious communities, including curriculum resources for private religious schools.

Let me state this another way. U. S. Secretary of Education Riley's 1995 and 1998 statements on religious expression in public school settings have been ignored almost thoroughly by "mainline" religious educators. If you do not know the content of Riley's statements, my point is made. Dewey would have been in the center of this discussion. The turn of attention by religious educators over the twentieth century from public discourse about religion, education, and the common good to denominationally-focused congregational needs is one in need of review, for it undermines not only "the play of difference,"
but also remains silent in the presence of a powerful and pervasive ideology that touches all citizens of the United States in one way or another. Keeping this history in mind, we now turn to the issue of tolerance.

Tolerance and Religious Education

The political understanding of tolerance in the United States forms a primary ideological field or context in which religious education takes place. Therefore, the present debate among political scientists about the meaning and function of toleration is essential to all of us who seek to engage in a religious education that embodies the play of diversity, including multicultural and multiconfessional dynamics. There are many forms of tolerance that are at stake in this context of conflict and debate. What is tolerance, and why is it a matter of importance for religious educators? Let us work inductively on this matter, by first illustrating where the Western idea of tolerance is coming under heavy critique.

Political scientist Andrew R. Murphy believes that at the very hour people in the United States need to learn how "to negotiate their inevitable differences peacefully," "not only can we not agree whether tolerance is good or bad, we can not even agree on what it is." Stephen Kautz at Emory University places the discussion a bit more starkly. He begins by affirming that "tolerance is a liberal virtue." He then continues:

...there is also a liberal nightmare. Beginning with Rousseau, even more or less friendly critics of liberal politics wondered: What is the real effect on the souls of human beings of the practice of the liberal freedoms? Do liberal citizens commonly display the complementary virtues of independence and self-restraint that liberal philosophy commends?

Philosopher Richard Rorty answers Kautz. He suggests that liberals "have become so open minded that our brains have fallen out," and that liberals have lost "any capacity for moral indignation, any capacity to feel contempt."

Herbert Marcuse took the criticism of tolerance, a keystone of liberalism, even further. Marcuse concludes that toleration is essentially an ideology of oppression, giving only the appearance of relation with freedom. He wrote harshly that today tolerance appears again as what it was in its origins, at the beginning of the modern period--a partisan goal, a subversive liberating notion and practice. Conversely, what is proclaimed and practiced as tolerance today, is in many of its most effective manifestations serving the cause of oppression.

Lest we conclude that only "liberals" are quick to point out the limitations of a liberal and Enlightenment-based understanding of tolerance, it is well to include two examples of such critique from what might be called "conservative" Christian voices. Bruce W. Speck at the University of Memphis, for example, contends that "many people claim that they are relativists and proponents of tolerance. Yet relativism cannot foster tolerance in part because it is untenable as a coherent philosophy." Or take Jesuit David Hollenbach, who concludes that

The standard response to the diversity of groups and value systems in Western political culture has long been an appeal to the virtue of tolerance. Tolerance is a
live-and-let-live attitude that avoids introducing conceptions of the full human good into political discourse….

if my analysis is correct, it [tolerance] actually further threatens democracy by deepening alienation and anomie.…

when the pluralism of diverse groups veers toward a state of group conflict with racial or class or religious dimensions, pure tolerance can become a strategy like that of the ostrich with its head in the sand.36

Feminist researchers have concluded often that this understanding of tolerance voiced by Hollenbach is essentially correct. For example, the research of Eleanor R. Hall, Judith Howard, and Sherrie L. Boezio have investigated the issue of rape tolerance. They conclude that "the relationship between tolerance of rape and sexist attitudes was stronger than the relationship between tolerance of rape and an antisocial personality."37 This study of a prison sample is important and suggestive for a host of reasons. But in regard specifically to the theme of tolerance, the researchers demonstrate how popularized notions of tolerance that work at a common sense or even pre-conscious level shape the attitudes of persons at all levels of society--and how these attitudes may reach to the deepest levels of our thinking and acting. As historian Henry F. May has noted, the Enlightenment "was too deeply embodied in the American institutions and habits of thought to be abandoned altogether."38

What can these representative approaches to the limits of tolerance tell us about the meaning of tolerance? 1) Tolerance is a description of the relation of persons in societal contexts where there is a presumed diversity of cultures and religions. 2) In the words of Richard Vernon and Samuel V. LaSelva, "we speak of tolerance/intolerance only in situations in which choices are to be made."39 3) There is something about "pure" tolerance that seems to undermine, rather than strengthen, the societal notion of democracy. And yet, tolerance was developed for democracy's good. But this hope seems not to have worked out in practice. 4) The language of tolerance is a language of power relations. Who shall be tolerated is, in the last analysis, a choice of those in power. 5) The limits of tolerance seem unclear. 6) The ground upon which tolerance draws its life seems inadequate for the common good. In fact, it appears that a "pure" tolerance would deny the possibility of a common good. 7) If we stand back and observe "tolerance as practiced," there are a surprising number of unlikely people who are convinced of its inherent limits--feminists, conservative Christians, post-modern philosophers, and social radicals. All these social critics presume that diversity is a permanent quality of our life together, and all presume that tolerance is "not working."

What I find interesting in most of the discussion and debate related to tolerance is that there are few voices that move beyond the present concerns about the limits of tolerance, into an analysis of the ground in which tolerance is given life. In a brief and suggestive way, I would like to look at selected aspects of that ground.
In his generative book, *Christianity and Liberal Society*, Robert Song correctly focuses on the theme of "limited government." He traces forms of constitutional liberalism that are informed by such Enlightenment figures as Emmanuel Kant, John Locke, and Montesquieu and concludes:

In general, it [constitutional liberalism] attempts to provide a theoretical justification for a set of practices clustered around the principle of limited government, including most or all of the following: effective restraints on the arbitrary or tyrannical use of power, constitutional definition of governmental powers, the rule of law, government legitimated by consent of the people, maintenance of the rights of individuals, especially their civil and political rights, official toleration of a plurality of religions and moral codes, and the legal protection of private property.40

Resistance to religious coercion,41 individualism (based in an understanding of the autonomy of the individual in economic affairs, including private interests and the market economy),42 rights, and private property: these form the interpretive horizon of our discussion of "toleration." But there was something more. In the words of Richard Rorty, "about two hundred years ago, the idea that truth was made rather than found began to take hold of the imagination of Europe." The Enlightenment politician who made this critical assumption about the nature of location of truth set "aside questions about both the will of God and the nature of man [sic] and dreams of creating a hitherto unknown form of society."43

In his *Letter Concerning Toleration*, John Locke could combine in a brilliant and artful manner the intertwining aspects of economics, individualism, private property, the State, religion, and toleration:

For the political society is instituted for no other end, but only to secure every man's [sic] possession of the things of this life. The care of each man's soul, and the things of heaven, which neither does belong to commonwealth nor can be subjected to it, is left entirely to every man's self.44

But even Locke could not imagine a form of religious tolerance that could include Muslims and Roman Catholics. Religious tolerance did have its limits for the common good. After all, if a mosque or a church acknowledged a "foreign" ruler, the security of the state was in jeopardy.45 This is a helpful corrective to the assumption that liberal tradition had no boundaries. It did have boundaries, based on the end of "political society." It is important to note that toleration and individual autonomy go together. One must be given the space, apart from the conformity-prone group, to develop one's own sense of identity.46

The place and role of religion within a political society that tolerated it is understandable given the Thirty Years War. If religion is essentially an irrational and violent pathogen within the political system, one is morally in the position to isolate it appropriately in order to contain its antisocial tendencies. What replaces religion is science. As we have seen, an educator such as John Dewey used the scientific method (with the method's inherent skepticism) not because this is how human beings naturally think or know—but because science and its method provided a structured and formal process of inquiry that was essentially civil.47

John Rawls, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, is one of the most eloquent spokespersons of the liberal ideal for political process in the United States today. He accepts "the fact of pluralism," and simultaneously looks forward to "social unity for a democratic society."48 He is eloquent
in his formulation of the interconnection of "society's main political, social and economic institutions, and how they fit into one unified scheme of public cooperation." Rawls suggests that "society's main institutions, together with the accepted forms of their interpretation, are seen as a fund of implicitly shared fundamental ideas and principles." Rawls concludes that what he calls "overlapping consensus" is possible between groups very much different from one another. What allows consensus is a shared sense of what counts as justice and fairness. Upon what is this idea of overlapping consensus built? Rawls reflects, "the virtues of tolerance and being ready to meet others halfway, and the virtue of reasonableness and the sense of fairness."

For me, Rawls has articulated a careful and constructively critical restatement of the liberal tradition for our times. Yet the interplay of overlapping consensus and tolerance only exacerbate the critiques of tolerance that are hotly debated today. The play of diversity is undermined by such an elegant model in important ways. The play of diversity, which requires dialogue for the good of all, is diluted. Contact between groups of difference come only at points of overlapping consensus related to issues of justice. One can imagine in this model that groups of diversity function best if they tend to stay away from one another in daily affairs. Diverse groups will tend to find points of agreement not through dialogue, but through coincidental areas of agreement. This process of what might be called managed diversity (with the state playing a "neutral role"), by maintaining an essentially traditional liberal understanding of toleration, misses the opportunity to engage in the play of diversity. As political scientist Susan Mendus has noted,

Autonomy-based liberalism ultimately contains no commitment to the value of diversity in and of itself. It justifies only those diverse forms of life which themselves value autonomy and thus makes toleration a pragmatic device--a temporary expedient--not a matter of principle.

Where does all of this leave us as religious educators at the dawn of a new millennium? Tolerance is not merely "the virtue of refraining from exercising one's power with regard to others' opinion or action although that deviates from one's own over something important, and although one morally disapproves of it," although it is that. It is also acceptance of a world view, more often than not by social absorption or assimilation than systematically learned, that had its origins in the Enlightenment. Understandings of self and autonomy, privacy, religion, science, community, diversity, power (especially as it is related to forms of totalitarianism), the state and neutrality, justice, and the common good that arise from this complex discussion form--in one way or another--an ethical vision that shapes our habits of daily life.

The play of diversity that Joan Wallach Scott so helpfully describes to us as she seeks to understand the nature of community may be thought of as a new language, or as a radical redescription of the relation of person and group. Clearly, her understanding of partage does not fit well with liberal conceptions of toleration. Partage assumes that alternative voices are not to be tolerated, but that these voices are essential to the good of the whole. Alternative voices are essential in the play of diversity. The autonomous individual of the liberal tradition is very different from the interdependent person.
affirmation of diversity in unity is very different from the liberal understanding of unity in diversity.\textsuperscript{57} The possibility that toleration may be used as a form of social oppression, that it leads to isolation and anomie, that a common good is ultimately beyond its limits are contrary to the themes of multiculturalism or multiconfessionalism. Religion viewed as a source of ideological critique for the good of the whole simply does not make sense in a liberal understanding of toleration.

This is a time of moving from one paradigm to another, when the implications of the new are not understood, and the limits of the old are becoming more and more apparent. It is impossible to know where we are going, or where we will end up. But we are on the journey. With this in mind, I would now like to move to the final section of this discussion.

**Beyond Tolerance: Radical Dialogue**

If a liberal understanding of tolerance alone is not adequate ground for the play of difference, multiculturalism, and multiconfessionalism suggested, where do we turn? More specifically, if I reject the notion that human beings are autonomous, isolated, self-realizers, where do I begin? What new language may be suggested for use? You have seen already my appreciation for and agreement with Joan Wallach Scott. But I not only believe that diversity is what communities have most in common. I also believe that to be human is to be in community. In his preface to *A Critique of Political Economy*, Karl Marx wrote that "it is not the consciousness of men [sic] that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness."\textsuperscript{58} Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann wrote in *The Social Construction of Reality*, "Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man [sic] is a social product."\textsuperscript{59}

Michael Sandel puts the matter even more directly. Writing from a postmodernist view, Sandel suggests that communities of interpretation locate the human contextually and historically. It is within specific communities that humans acquire "loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are--as members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons and daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic."\textsuperscript{60} But Sandel goes further, suggesting that this communitarian view is essentially an anti-liberal critique of Enlightenment principles and of toleration itself. He contends that "to imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without character, without moral depth."\textsuperscript{61}

What does it mean to be human? To be human means to be in community. What is the nature of community? The nature of community is diversity. It is both multicultural and multiconfessional. How do we come to know in community? We come to know in community by the process of contest and of *partage* in the play of difference. How may this process of context and of *partage* be characterized? This process may be characterized as radical dialogue. What is the process of radical dialogue, the process of how we come to know?
It is this last question that is of particular interest to religious educators. As we noted previously, it has been the habit of liberal religious educators to presume that John Dewey was correct. Dewey assumed that the primary way we come to know is through a process of critical reflection based on scientific inquiry. This assumption holds all the way from Dewey to such educators as Thomas Groome or Richard Robert Osmer. Allow me to illustrate this matter. What holds Dewey and Groome together is not a common democratic vision, but the scientific method of knowing. Dewey, in the liberal tradition, trusted science not religion for guidance in his understanding of how we know. In his book *How We Think*, Dewey suggests a manner of "reflective thinking" based on the formal process of scientific inquiry. Dewey's familiar five steps of reflective thinking were: 1) suggestions, 2) statement of problem, 3) formation of hypothesis, 4) elaboration, and 5) testing of hypothesis. There is no indication that Dewey really believed that people naturally thought in this manner. But it was a disciplined, systematic and ordered way to enter into conversation with others in a peaceful manner.

In his book *Can Religious Education Be Christian?* liberal religious educator Harrison S. Elliott took Dewey's five steps of reflective thinking, and applied them to the study of the Protestant Christian Bible. The five steps of what Elliott called "a life situation approach" to Bible study were: 1) "the actual life situation being faced was described and explored in the group," 2) "the possible alternatives of action were defined," 3) "these were compared on the basis of their probable consequences in the situation, if put into effect," 4) "they were evaluated on the basis of points of emphasis in the Bible or other Christian teaching," and 5) "the group was led to make either individual or group decision as to what attitude to take in the solution of the problem."

The relation between Dewey and Elliott is clear, as is the relation between Elliott and Groome. The movements of Groome's "shared praxis" model include an introductory focusing activity, followed by: 1) naming/expressing "present action," and 2) critical reflection on present action; 3) making accessible Christian Story and Vision and 4) dialectical hermeneutic to appropriate the Christian Story/Vision to participant's Stories and Visions; and 5) decision/response for lived Christian faith.

D. E. Comstock has referred to this approach to knowledge based on scientific inquiry as "positive social science." Positive social science differs from "critical social science" in that positive social science affirms the old Deweyan approach to scientific knowing, while critical social science turns to communities of persons in order to find out how those communities in their daily life together in the world are creating knowledge. For researchers in education, this shift in thinking has enormous consequences. Instead of forming hypotheses that can seek verification "out there," researchers live in community to discover truth created in context. Richard Rorty puts it this way.

We need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there. To say the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states. To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations.
Truth cannot be out there--cannot exist independently of the human mind--because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not.58

While the scientific method may be a useful research tool in the natural world, it is less clear that the scientific method has value for religious education. A research method appropriate to the natural world does not mean that it will be the basis for an adequate understanding of teaching and learning. In fact, living together in community is not a "method" at all. It is an art of interdependence. It is the play of diversity. The art of interdependence in community does not search for truth "out there," but looks for truth in the radically contextually situated community. If this is so, religious educators are not specifically interested in teaching method per se, but in those patterns of action and being in community that nurture and reform the play of difference. 69

In 1982, Carol Gilligan published In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development.70 For a host of reasons, it is a touchstone study. I believe that in Gilligan's description of "an ethic of care," we have the roots of an alternative basis for teaching and learning in communities of difference. Some of you may remember her words about a new connection between self and other.

Care becomes the self-chosen principle of a judgment that remains psychological in its concern with relationships and response but becomes universal in its condemnation of exploitation and hurt. Thus a progressively more adequate understanding of the psychology of human relationships--an increasing differentiation of self and other and a growing comprehension of the dynamics of social interaction--informs the development of an ethic of care. This ethic, which reflects a cumulative knowledge of human relationships, evolves around a central insight, and self and other are interdependent. 71

Building on this seminal work, I would like to propose that within community characterized by diversity, life together that is characterized by empathy, caring, and friendship will give rise to a pattern of hospitality that encourages and strengthens "the play of difference." Moreover, I would like to propose that empathy, caring, and friendship are essential ways we come to know who we are in relation with others.

In order to place the discussion of empathy, caring, and friendship in context, let me say a few words first about hospitality. Hospitality is a non-linear dance between empathy, caring, and friendship. Hospitality is not a virtue, not something to aspire toward. Hospitality presents itself as the dance--sometimes slow, sometimes rapid--goes on. Hospitality reminds me most of composer Colin McPhee's "Tabuh-Tabuhan, Toccata for Orchestra and Two Pianos," including "the drum, a gong, xylophone" as well as the Balinese gamelan.72 Swirling, impossible to listen to without much concentration, wild. Hospitality has the inner logic not of science but of ritual, including consciously leaving an ordinary space and moving to a space prepared as sacred; bringing of a sacrifice; disorientation from which there is no return; a test followed by celebration; and renewed life for the whole community.73 Hospitality takes us back to ancient conceptions. Classicist Susan Ford Wiltshire has written that

Modern hospitality is typically a transaction among friends. Ancient hospitality is a transaction among strangers. Modern hospitality reinforces our familiarities. Ancient hospitality alters us by exposing us to outsiders. Ancient hospitality--
"xenia" in the Greek tradition and "hospitium" or "ius hospitii" in the Roman—thus provides a meeting place for the public and private realms.  

Curiously, very little is understood about the development of empathy in our adult years. Most research on the development of empathy looks at young children. Certainly, the development of empathy is crucial in the young child for all of life. Judith V. Jordan has noted that

Crucial to a mature sense of mutuality is an appreciation of the wholeness of the other person, with a special awareness of the other's subjective experience. Thus the other person is not there merely to take care of one's needs, to become a vessel for one's projections or transferences, or to be the object of discharge of instinctual impulses. Through empathy, and an active interest in the other as a different, complex person, one develops the capacity at first to allow the other's differentness and ultimately to value and encourage those qualities that make that person different and unique.

For Daniel Batson, empathy is connected intimately with compassion. This idea about the interplay of empathy and compassion is related to the understanding of suffering developed by Dorothee Soelle, or of pathos developed by theologian Edward Farley. Soelle writes,

When you look at human suffering concretely, you destroy all innocence, all neutrality, every attempt to say, "It wasn't I; there was nothing I could do; I didn't know." In the face of suffering you are either with the victim or the executioner—there is no other option.

Farley contends that "empathy, concerned suffering participation in the life of the genuine other, is a kind of activity and even efficacy, not in the sense of external force, but something that evokes response." David Woodruff Smith suggests that "in empathetic perception, I see 'her' as another 'I,' a fellow [sic] subject whose selfhood I understand through empathy and my own self awareness."

Empathy is the essential core of hospitality, of the ability to recognize the "other" as fully human. With this recognition comes suffering. Where there is no empathy, where there is no suffering in the presence of the other, there are the seeds of violence. Where there is no empathy, there can be no forgiveness, no caring. For the past eight years, I have been conducting a research project related to adult memories of childhood bullying. While my findings are tentative, and my research ongoing, I conclude presently that the bully has keen empathic skills without empathy. She or he is able to imagine, to intuit, what the other is feeling—more often than not with amazing precision. But the other is an object, because the self itself is an isolated object without feeling—but with a deep yearning to feel and be in relation with self and with other. Through acts of violence, the bully is able to transcend isolation and lack of feeling—but only for a brief moment. It is as if violence provides an energy powerful enough to break through the durable defenses of self-isolation and self-protection that allow life to continue on a daily basis. Violence is not only the illusion of relation, but is in fact relation, but without empathy or sympathy or caring. It is ultimately more and more isolating, more and more numbing—but is a signal of the spiritual longing to be in relation with. For the bully, violence is one of a few places in her or his life where pleasure, however fleetingly, is experienced—where relation with the other is experienced. This experience of being in relation with the other may be described as hate or rage or contempt. It is a living hell, because
through violence the person becomes more and more isolated. Violence gives the bully exactly the opposite of what he or she yearns for. Violence is addictive. It gives intense momentary pleasure. And like any drug, violence must increase in order to repeat the sensation of intimacy with the other that was once experienced, that was once felt. To be a bully is to be a person in deep self-destructive spiritual crisis. The path of the bully who desires to be in relation with the other is to destroy the other, who in the end survives in utter isolation. We may find this understanding of the bully frighteningly horrible, for we know that the bully may be an individual, a group of persons, or even a national phenomenon. 

How do we teach empathy? I am more and more convinced we teach empathy by modeling it ourselves in our relations with others. I am finding that even for adults, many lives have been turned from violence, prejudice, racism and hatred by the act of another child or another adult being willing to suffer with them in their painful isolation. Sometimes, empathy takes the form of confrontation in love and justice. In a very unusual story in the Christian book of Matthew, Jesus encounters a Canaanite woman. The story reads this way:

Jesus left that place and went to the district of Tyre and Sidon. Just then a Canaanite woman from that region came out and started shouting, "Have mercy on me, Lord, Son of David; my daughter is tormented by a demon. But he did not answer her at all. And his disciples came and urged him, saying, "Send her away, for she keeps shouting for us." He answered, "I was sent only to the lost sheep of Israel." But she came and knelt before him, saying, "Lord, help me." He answered, "It is not fair to take the children's food and throw it to the dogs." She said, "Yes, Lord, yet even the dogs eat the crumbs that fall from their master's table." Then Jesus answered her, "Woman, great is your faith! Let it be done for you as you wish." And her daughter was healed instantly.

This biblical passage has been interpreted in many different ways. But what I would like to focus on is the relation between Jesus and the Canaanite woman. Historically, Jews despised and hated Canaanites. They were disposable, idol-worshipping heathens. The best thing to do with them was to force them from their lands so that Jews could occupy them. When the Palestinian Jew Jesus is confronted by a Canaanite, the possibility for religious, racial, and ethnic hatred to surface was real. Add to that, that this was a woman, and the scene is set. The disciples tell her to leave, and they embody the violence they have learned from generations of hate and prejudice.

Even Jesus implies she is a "dog." One commentary suggests that Jesus' use of the word "dog" is really not all that bad. After all, the "diminutive form" of the word "dog" was used. "You little dog" does not seem to help the situation much. Jesus as xenophobic racist is a hard pill to swallow. In the words of Sam Keen in Faces of the Enemy, "Before we enter into warfare or genocide, we first dehumanize those we mean to 'eliminate.'" Just a little dog. But in a moment of enormous strength, dignity, nonviolence and wisdom brimming with suffering, the Canaanite woman sympathetic throws up to Jesus a mirror in which to see the dehumanizing force of his own words, not as an act of retribution, but as embodiment of a caring and empathetic teacher who believes so deeply in the necessity of interdependence, including interdependence with the Palestinian Jew, that she is willing to perish for it. And remarkably, Jesus sees
himself. Through the eyes of a non-person, Jesus sees himself, repents, and learns more fully what it means to be human.

In the words of pastoral caregiver Marie McCarthy, "Empathy creates an environment where it is safe to know and to not know, where it is safe to explore, make mistakes, be uncertain, where it is possible to see things in new ways." Within the play of difference, a safe environment necessarily includes constructive, often life-changing conflict. Through confrontation, the Canaanite woman created a safe environment where Jesus could see his hate, where Jesus could move beyond violence, where Jesus could know the Canaanite woman as fully human, and from which Jesus could leave transformed. Jesus and the Canaanite woman were engaged in radical dialogue, which afforded an expanded understanding of religion.

C. Daniel Batson, Patricia Schoenrade, and W. Larry Ventis have demonstrated in a convincing way that our understanding of religion goes through dimensions, each dimension made possible by safe learning environments. The most basic is referred to as "the extrinsic, means dimension" of religion. In this dimension, people use religion "to attain self-serving ends." The next dimension is called "the intrinsic, means dimension" of religion. In this stage, while there is the rhetoric of compassion, openness to diversity, and decreased prejudice, "this dimension seems to be associated with a self-serving concern to appear" open-minded.

"The quest dimension" is characterized by ambiguity, flexibility, "and to increased responsiveness to the needs of the distressed….Reflecting on this evidence as a whole, the quest dimension appears to be associated with a religion of less faith…but of more works." This simple model reminds us that change in world view and values related to religion is related directly to personal identity and identity with others. While one may move to the quest dimension in a transformational moment of learning, it is more likely that the process is a prolonged and complicated one. This too is a part of what counts as a diverse community, staying in relation with those who are growing.

How is empathy a form of knowing? In and through empathy, we learn the basis for a healthy and life giving interdependence in our diversities. Again, in the words of McCarthy, "empathy is above all a disposition, a way-of-being-in-the-world, which is characterized by a sense of openness, wonder, flexibility, and play." Or in the words of H. Edward Everding and Lucinda A. Huffaker, "empathy is not only an important quality of the 'holding environment' that is conducive to growth, but it is also recognized as a conduit for self-development through the experience of 'holding' others."

Without the disposition of empathy, it is impossible to care. Just as empathy is a way of knowing, so also is caring. Just as empathy is a form of radical dialogue, so also is caring. Perhaps more than anyone else, the work of Nel Noddings has helped educators to consider the central role of caring in our communities of learning. For me, the most helpful aspect of Noddings work is what she calls the relation between "the one-caring" and "the cared for." She writes eloquently that to be in relation with "the cared for" maintains and enhances the relatedness that is fundamental to human reality and, in education, it sets the stage for the teacher's effort in maintaining and increasing the child's receptive capacity. As the teacher receives the child and works with
him on cooperatively designed projects, as she resists the temptation--or the 
mandate--to manipulate the child, to squeeze him into some mold, she establishes 
a climate of receptivity. The one caring reflects reality as she sees it to the child. She 
accepts him as she hopes he will accept himself--seeing what is there, 
considering what might be changed, speculating on what might be. 98

Within communities of diversity, caring for one another, caring for self, caring for the world are 
mandatory. To be cared for is a basic human need.99 To be in a caring relation with another human being 
is essential for the moral and psychological health of the community. Noddings has received some amount 
of criticism for her understanding of the limits of caring, and for the unequal power dynamics involved in 
caring. I believe what Noddings helps us understand are the very real dynamics of caring in the real world. 
She writes insightfully from experience.

For example, her following words about caring might at first strike us as odd, even as non-
democratic:

This attitude of warm acceptance and trust is important to all caring relationships. 
We are primarily interested in parent-child and teacher-student relationships but it 
is clear that caring is completed in all relationships through the apprehension of 
caring by the cared-for. When this attitude is missed, the one who is the object of 
caretaking feels like an object. He is being treated, handled by formula. When it 
is present and recognized, the natural effectance motivation is enhanced.100

But upon closer examination, the caring relation is not characterized by the cared-for as an object alone. 
Rather, the cared-for is actively involved in the process of caring. Noddings states

The insistence on including the cared-for as an active contributor to the caring 
relation makes it impossible to codify caring…at bottom, I have to respond to the 
cared-for who addresses me in a special way and asks me for something concrete, 
and even unique. Thus what I as a career do for one person may not satisfy 
another. I take my cues not from a stable principle but from the living other 
whom I encounter.101

In other words, both parties "are constrained by an ethic of care."102 Caring, then, may be understood as an 
important movement in the play of difference that includes the entire "physical, sensual, and living 
world."103

Empathy and caring relate directly to what Noddings calls a "constructivist" understanding of 
teaching and learning. Noddings reviews the story of Benny, a math student who

had a system for converting his answers to the ones on the answer sheet provided 
by the curriculum. His method was systematic, and he could explain it. Converting 3/2 to .5, for example, involved adding 2 and 3 and prefixing a 
decimal point. That this rule also made it possible to convert 2/3 to .5 did not 
seem to bother Benny. Constructivists often point to the case of Benny because it illustrates how badly 
mathematics can be learned when a curriculum does not encourage mathematical 
thinking. But the problem here is not that Benny fails to construct (he could 
hardly avoid doing so) but, rather, that the environment fails to press Benny to 
correct his misconceptions.104

This simple insight applies to communities of difference. If one wishes to create and sustain a community 
characterized by the play of difference, the rules of individualism and competitive isolation will not
produce such a community. Empathy and caring, on the other hand, are congruent with that enterprise. Empathy creates the space in which caring-in-relation can take place.

Friendship emerges from the contexts of empathy and caring. Friendship is "a relation of mutuality, respect, fidelity, confidence and affection." Friendship focuses intentionally on community, honesty, non-exclusivity, flexibility, and other-directedness. A process of thoughtfulness, which includes "on the one hand by ability to reason and on the other by considerateness and caring" is characteristic. In the words of Roberta C. Bondi, "no human relationship can be described accurately as a friendship where one person is powerless and vulnerable while the other holds all the power, has no needs, and is invulnerable to hurt from the other." Friendship is the relational pattern that guides all conversation with the stranger. It is the method, the hermeneutical process, of solidarity. Friendship is socially disruptive. Janice Raymond writes, "friendship is political; i.e., as the Greeks especially knew, it has power to affect the world and to change the distribution of power in the world."

By contrast, an enemy is a person who holds all power, who has no needs, who is self-centered and inconsiderate, and who consciously chooses not to care. To be an enemy does not mean that a person has to be perceived of as mean. An enemy may be quite cordial in their social and political patterns of violence and victimization. To be a friend is a political act. To be an enemy is a political act. Both are expressed in terms of social reality and power distribution.

This is not to imply that friends are of a single mind. Within every friend is the stranger. A friend is not a perfect person, simply one who chooses to err on the side of friendship. Within the friend is the stranger, and this stranger manifests itself in different ways. On the one hand, the stranger is the enemy within who seeks to be non-mutual and manipulative. On the other hand, the stranger is the good news of Jesus that seeks mutuality and caring. The only difference between a friend and an enemy is that the friend chooses to err on the side of the gospel stranger. The enemy, on the other hand, chooses to err on the side of the anti-gospel. C. G. Jung once asked the following question, "What if I should discover that the least amongst them all, the poorest of all the beggars, the most impudent of all the offenders...are within me...that I myself am the enemy who must be loved--what then?"

Friendship is hard, deliberate work. Friendship is inner-directed, as well as outer-directed. It is not a means to perfection, nor an avenue to easy or absolute clarity about decision making in every situation. The art and act of friendship is a way of building communities of diversity. Being a friend is an act of hospitality because friendship implies a humane pattern of solidarity with all.

Social psychologists have found that in popular culture, a person is likely to become a friend:

1. If the person has similar attitudes, beliefs, values, behavioral preferences and personality traits.
2. If the person satisfies, rather than ignores or frustrates our needs.
3. If the person is physically attractive.
4. If the person is socially competent.
5. If the person is generally pleasant and agreeable to us and our associates.
6. If the person reciprocates our liking.
7. If the person is generally in geographic proximity.
This is an understanding of the bases of friendship that is incongruent with communities of difference. Such communities, we recall, affirm from the beginning that differences are what people have most in common. The community of friendship transcends geographical and political boundaries, while attending to the specificity of the "cared-for."

Empathy creates the space in which the practices of caring and friendship may be practiced. Empathy, caring, and friendship are ways of knowing, ways of living interdependently in communities of difference. Together, they embody a process of radical dialogue, in which transformation may take place. Empathy, caring, and friendship move beyond tolerance as a basic orientation of taking seriously the fact of increasing diversity, including religious diversity, in the world. This move beyond tolerance does not presume an autonomous individual, nor personal rights. This move beyond tolerance does not look for overlapping consensus, but for a predisposition toward partage. As such, multicultural and multiconfessional communities embrace the diversity within their lives—and between communities that are different. Empathy, caring, and friendship are both ways of knowing and radical ways of engaging in dialogue with the "other."

Yet, a final question must be asked. "What if the 'other' refuses dialogue? What then?" What about Nazis, neo-Nazis, or the Ku Klux Klan? What about paramilitary isolationists and racial hate groups? On this matter, there is no consensus. Let me give two very different viewpoints, and then offer a humble evaluation of my own.

Michael J. Perry, professor at Northwestern University School of Law, suggests in his book *Love and Power: The Role of Religion and Morality in American Politics*, that there are very clear boundaries between groups that are willing to engage in dialogue, and those groups that are not. Working from a liberal understanding of tolerance, Perry concludes "there is no, or little, authentic dialogue among, or with, the intolerant." He continues,

To practice ecumenical political tolerance is...to make such judgements, and sometimes to make them publicly, perhaps in dialogue, but to refrain from coercing others on the basis of the judgments, especially to refrain from using the apparatus of the state to coerce others.\[115\]

In the discussion about inter-religious dialogue, David Lochhead has written

there are some individuals and groups who are not capable of dialogue...certain groups and individuals behave in a way that continually subverts the dialogical process. The problem is that dialogue itself is not possible.\[116\]

Philosopher Richard Rorty takes a very different path. He seeks to remain in dialogue with everyone, for diverse persons help us overcome particularly intractable cases of blindness by letting us see the "peculiar identity" of events which exemplify, for example, sexual perversion, extreme cruelty, ridiculous obsession, and manic delusion. He [Freud] let us see each of these as the private poem of the pervert, the sadist, or the lunatic: each as richly textured and "redolent of moral memories" as our own life. He lets us see what moral philosophy describes as extreme, inhuman, and unnatural, as continuous with our own activity...He just wants to give us one more redescription of things to be filed alongside all the others....\[117\]
These are two very different approaches. From my viewpoint, the question of Perry is limited by his goal, political toleration. This narrow understanding of the relation of diverse groups or persons results in a discussion of rights and the use of power. Lochhead’s goal seems to be dialogue. Again, this goal is needlessly confining. Dialogue is a process, not a final objective. What may appear at first glance as anti-dialogical may in fact be a dimension or movement in the process of religious understanding.

Rorty is closer to the model of understanding of this presentation. If it is human, we need to know about it. Different persons in our communities of difference have different abilities, skills, and expertise. No one is to be precluded because of preconception or stereotype. Issues of personal and group safety are always to be taken into account. There are times when we must agree with Umberto Eco’s recent statement that “one must set the boundaries of the intolerable.” But even here there are some communities who are able to engage groups that others simply cannot. I am reminded of Kathleen M. Blee’s book on women who joined the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920’s. The remarkable aspect of Blee’s book for me is that she helps us understand that Indiana women who joined the Klan in the 1920’s did so “precisely because it fit the life and values of many white Protestants.” What had the appearance and social acceptance as normal and wholesome was, in fact, the opposite. Ideological critique by an utopian religious community is an act, in even the best scenarios, of bold humility with the intention of hospitality.

This search for a new language is as complicated and exciting as it is important. In the last analysis, empathy, caring, and friendship are contextual—and it is within the context itself that communities of diversity will reflect, suffer, act and grow. This is the nature of the dance of hospitality—a dance that moves us beyond tolerance toward a human radical dialogue in an era of increasing religion. This is the context for religious education in the new millennium.

* I have respectfully plagiarized the title of this lecture from two sources. First is the chapter entitled "Beyond Tolerance" by Robert Paul Wolff in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE by Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). The term "expanding religion" is from Thomas Luckmann, "Shrinking Transcendence, Expanding Religion?" SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, v. 50, n. 2, 1990, pp. 127-38. While I have taken a very different approach than either of these authors, both sparked initial interest in the topics at hand. Thanks also to religious education students at Columbia Theological Seminary, Elizabeth Johnson, Christine Yoder, Henry Simmons, Susan Hecker, and Kathleen O’Connor, for giving critique to various aspects of this paper.

1 The predominantly Afro-Asian conference held at the Indian Social Institute, February 2-6, 1998, entitled "Colonialism to Globalization: Five Centuries After Vasco da Gama," focused in a compelling way upon the relation of national debt, health care, and education—in light of decisions by G-7, the IMF, the World Bank, and WTO.

2 Simone Weil, THE ILIAD OR THE POEM OF FORCE (Wallingford, Pennsylvania: Pendle Hill, 1983), p. 3. While contemporary cinema has blurred the matter of “force,” in popular Western culture, Weil is correct: whatever its use, force is dehumanizing.

It will become apparent in this paper that the Enlightenment notion of tolerance is a gendered issue. Joan Wallach Scott notes of France, "From the Revolution of 1789 until 1944, citizens were men." ONLY PARADOXES TO OFFER: FRENCH FEMINISTS AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. ix.


The French root for partage is partager, which means to share, to parcel out, to divide. The noun is a sharing, partition, distribution, or portion.


David Tracy makes much the same case when he says, "To play a game demands that I be willing to allow the movement peculiar to this particular game to take over." David Tracy, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION, HOPE (San Francisco: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1987), p. 17.


Discussion of art and common sense by Geertz may be found in his LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

Fallers, as quoted by Geertz in "Ideology As a Cultural System," THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES, p. 231.

While Geertz is helpful in defining religion as a cultural system, he is less helpful in imagining the positive possibility of its critique of ideology. This may be in part related to his indebtedness to the functionalism of Talcott Parsons, upon whom Geertz builds much of his own anthropological approach.


Charles R. Kinker, Iowa State University, is a notable exception here. For years, he has focused on the interplay of religion and the education of the public.


For an overview of the commitment to democracy of these leaders in the religious education movement, see Ronald H. Cram, ed., UNDERSTANDING TRENDS IN PROTESTANT EDUCATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Lanham: University Press of America, 1998), pp. 17-85.

John Dewey, A COMMON FAITH, p. 84.


Groome changes his terminology to "reign of God" in his *Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry: The Way of Shared Praxis* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991). He finds the "reign of God" to be "the most comprehensive symbol of the telos of Christian faith" (p. 14; see also pp. 16-17). This is an highly contestable matter, to which I will return later in this essay. He does mention the term "democracy" in this volume, only to deny (without careful argument or reason) its generative value (p. 14).


(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1987). When the history of ideological critique in religious education is written, Kennedy will be remembered as the most important and eloquent spokesperson in the United States. In my view, his work was so consistently ahead of its time, many in religious education passed over it without realizing "why." My own work in religious education is a modest footnote to the work Kennedy completed many years ago.


*Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 3.


Ibid., pp. 156 ff. See also an excellent summary of these matters in Alfred Cobban, *In Search of Humanity: The Role of Enlightenment in Modern History* (London: Jonathan
Akbar S. Ahmed notes what he calls "the inexplicable fear of Muslim minorities" across the world, including Israel, India, and Pakistan. See his *ISLAM TODAY: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE MUSLIM WORLD* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999). For an example of how the ideal of tolerance results in isolation and political mistrust, see Daniel Bower, "Russian Roads to Mecca: Religious Tolerance and Muslim Pilgrimage in the Russian Empire," *SLAVIC REVIEW*, v. 55, n. 3, fall 1993, pp. 567-84.

This liberal notion of group as antithetical to self realization has received little attention by religious educators. It is the view of this paper that such an understanding of "group" is not normative.

That scientific knowing became paradigmatic for all knowing is an issue that will be addressed in the last section of this paper.


Ibid., p. 3.

Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid., pp. 4-5, 17.

Ibid., 17.

Ibid.


Ibid., *TOLERATION*, p. 108.


This distinction was made by Michael Kinnamon, Professor of Theology and Ecumenical Studies, Lexington Theological Seminary, at a lecture on ecumenics at Columbia Theological Seminary, Georgia in March 1999. While not addressing the topic of this paper, the simple distinction seems very useful.


Osmer contends (implicitly) that the method of practical theological reflection is essentially scientific. See his five stages of practical theological reflection in Richard Robert Osmer, *A TEACHABLE SPIRIT: RECOVERING THE TEACHING OFFICE IN THE CHURCH* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), p. 167. Carol Lakey Hess in her book *CARETAKERS OF OUR COMMON HOUSE: WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT IN COMMUNITIES OF FAITH* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997), p. 241-45, attempts to revise Groome's shared praxis model to take into account findings from feminist studies. However, her critique is confined by the limits of the scientific method. Why? My guess is that religious educators' imaginations have been confined by notions of "teaching method" in classroom/like settings, rather than on the question of communal knowing. This is an area of needed future research.


This was recognized some time ago by James E. Loder, *THE TRANSFORMING MOMENT: UNDERSTANDING CONVICTIONAL EXPERIENCES* (San Francisco: Harper and Row Publishers, 1981). While Loder's alternative to scientific knowing may be debated, his critique of the limits of scientific knowing is astute.
66 Groome, SHARING FAITH, pp. 155-293. I have noticed that many religious groups have used the "shared praxis" approach in denomination curriculum resources--without taking seriously Groome's theological framework as a whole into account in the educational design. This pick and choose approach to curriculum design needs careful reconsideration.
68 Rorty, CONTINGENCY, p. 5.
69 I have great appreciation for the work of Quaker religious educator Parker J. Palmer. Yet, his affirmation that "truth is neither 'out there' nor 'in here,' but both" is distinct from the argument of this paper. From my viewpoint, truth is very much located "in here," in the community. See Parker J. Palmer, TO KNOW AS WE ARE KNOWN: A SPIRITUALITY OF EDUCATION (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1983), p. 55. It may be that from 1983 to 1998, he comes to affirm that "to teach is to create a space in which the community of truth is practiced." But by the latter part of his 1998 offering, he is back in the classroom! See Parker J. Palmer, THE COURAGE TO TEACH: EXPLORING THE INNER LANDSCAPE OF A TEACHER'S LIFE (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998), 90 ff.
70 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
71 Ibid., p. 74.
73 This theme is worthy of development on its own terms. One of the more suggestive books on the theme of ritual is by Herbert Anderson and Edward Foley, MIGHTY STORIES, DANGEROUS RITUALS: WEAVING TOGETHER THE HUMAN AND THE DIVINE (San Francisco: Josey-Bass, 1998). An older treatment, which includes a good review and critique of Turner is Tom Faw Driver, THE MAGIC OF RITUAL (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991). The logic I describe is my own.
78 For a summary of this perspective, see Mark Davis, EMPATHY: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH (Madison, Wisconsin: Brown and Benchmark, 1994), p. 8.
For a biographical affirmation of this statement, see the tragic story of Kent Liederbach (a bullied child) in a newspaper article by Chris Swingle, "Bullying 's Scars Run Deep," **ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT AND CHRONICLE**, Sunday, May 2, 1999, pp. 1A, 11A.


How else is it possible that Sophia Lyon Fahs could write in 1907, of a Ugandan religious leader, "Now and then a wizard, assuming a high falsetto voice, would rave like a lunatic," or "By October, 1884, eighty-eight Waganda had been baptized. Black men, women and children were being born again with new hearts pure and white"? (Sophia Blanche Lyon Fahs, **UGANDA'S WHITE MAN OF WORK: A STORY OF ALEXANDER M. MACKAY** (New York: Young People's Missionary Movement, 1907), pp. 113, 169.) Fahs' life is a wonderful example of growth in empathy, grounded in an utopian religious community of caring.


In Mary Ann Tolbert's analysis of **Mark**, attention is given to the parallel story of the Syroophoenician woman in **Mark** 7:24-30. Tolbert concludes that the use of "dog" may be related to the philosophical movement of the Cynics. While the argument has merit, and while Tolbert concludes that Jesus learned from the woman, it is unlikely that Jesus' negative reaction to the woman in the beginning of the story is merely "role play." It is my view that such an interpretation misses the violence and force of the racism and sexism of Jesus. Mary Ann Tolbert, "Mark," **THE WOMEN'S BIBLE COMMENTARY**, eds. Carol A. Newsom and Sharon Ringe (London: SPCK, 1992), p. 269.


For a more complete understanding of the relation of empathy and confrontation in pastoral care, see Ralph L. Underwood, **EMPATHY AND CONFRONTATION IN PASTORAL CARE**, ed. Don S. Browning (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985). Confrontation and respect are central aspects of this text.


Ibid., 373.

Ibid., p. 375.

Ibid., pp. 375-76.

There is great debate in the area of empathy studies related to empathy as process and outcome. I do not find these debates particularly valuable or generative. However, for a sense of this debate, see Mark Davis, **EMPATHY**; and Arthur C. Bohart and Leslie S. Greenberg, **EMPATHY RECONSIDERED: NEW DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY** (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1997). Emphasis mine.


"Educating Adults for Empathy: Implications of Cognitive Role-Taking and Identity Formation," **RELIGIOUS EDUCATION**, v. 93, n. 4, fall 1998, p.421. It may be that the current interest in mentoring may be related directly to "teaching" empathy. See Susan B. Thistlehwaite and George F. Cains, eds.,
BEYOND THEOLOGICAL TOURISM: MENTORING AS A GRASSROOTS APPROACH TO THEORETICAL EDUCATION (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1994).


100 "The Cared For," p. 27.


102 Ibid., p. 189.


109 Karl F. Morrison criticizes the German philosopher Fichte at just this point. Morrison notes that Fichte believed that "the destiny of the human race was its harmonious unity. The vocation to humanity was a call to each conscience to live up to its duty, in freedom, to enlarge the union of sympathy that actually existed among human beings, a mysterious union transcending time and space." However, Fichte's understanding of diversity or the stranger was fatally limited. Jews were understood to be the obstacle to human unity, and they needed to be deported to a "homeland." Karl F. Morrison, "I AM YOU": THE HERMENEUTICS OF EMPATHY IN WESTERN LITERATURE, THEOLOGY, AND ART (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. xi-xii.


115 Ibid.


120 Ibid., p. 154.