In their current simplification of world disorder and its causes, American leaders are fond of distinguishing between the essentially good and ethical core of a religious tradition and the perversion of its message and doctrines by unappointed apostles. According to the heuristics adopted since the events of September 11, 2001, a fundamentally peaceful religion was itself tyrannized by a relatively small band of theologically naïve militants who are out of step with the religious mainstream of the Islamic world. In this essentially political formulation, the term, “Islam” performs roughly the same function as the double-barreled term “Judaeo-Christian” performs, or used to perform in pre-pluralistic America, when the locution seemed to suggest a way around using more specific names, such as Biblical faith, haggadah, or Christian doctrine to describe particular ideas or moral commitments. And though theological correctness may cause us to prefer the idea of a refined essence, so designated, to the historical specifics of any tradition, we are all normally aware that the sentence “Islam is a peaceful religion” is no different from saying “The Judaeo-Christian tradition is about love and tolerance”—that is to say, an interpretative generalization not altogether supported by the weight of history and practice. In what follows, I want to look at the nature of interpretative generalizations and what they tell us about the nature of religion in general and religiously-motivated violence in particular.

The origin of this generalization is relatively recent, or at least modern: it is traceable to late Enlightenment thinking, to Hegel’s spiritual view of history, and that of his disciples Ludwig Feuerbach and D.F. Strauss, both of whom believed that if Christianity had outgrown the mythology of its sacred texts, the doctrinal formulations of its intellectual expounders—the church fathers, the medieval finery of the scholastics and even the well-intentioned but incomplete housecleaning of the reformers, it nonetheless possessed in the teaching of the founder—so it was assumed by liberal Protestantism anyway—a pure ethical vision compatible with the enlightened morality of Kantian ethic. To read the theological work of Feuerbach or his early twentieth century heir Adolph von Harnack is to envision a triptych with Jesus Pedagogicus at the center flanked to his left by an inspired Kant, to his right by a self-satisfied Hegel, and a cloud surmounting the central figure emblazoned with the words “Love Truth, Observe the Zeitgeist, and Do Your Duty.” It did not take much to destroy this image—though large sectors of the Christian community are unaware of its destruction—only the work of the Jesuit turned skeptic, Alfred Loisy in a book directed against Harnack’s _The Essence of Christianity_, a book about Christian ethicalism, in which he wrote, “Professor Harnack has looked long and deep into the well to find the historical Jesus, but has seen instead only the reflection of his liberal Protestant face.”

I mention this lingering tendency of the late Enlightenment to reduce specific religion to general morality for a reason, not only because it remains a standard way of distinguishing between the religious ideal and temporal religious realities, but also because any attempt to understand any religion in this reductionistic way is subject to disconfirming facts, some historical, some intrinsic to the religion itself, that render the interpretive generalization absurd. To paraphrase Freud, we would not call someone a good or a peace-loving man and then go on to recite a history of his thefts and murders without assuming that the second statement had an effect on our original assertion. We would be stuck between asserting the first and keeping quiet about the second, which is deception, or reciting the list of crimes and being mistaken about the first, which is foolishness.
Religions of course are not thieves masquerading as saints, but for purposes of understanding the weakness of interpretative generalizations it is important to be aware of the vulnerability of “identifying” as Harnack tried to do, a pure and incorrupt kernel of Christianity, or any religious tradition—that of the founder—hidden by the husks of interpretation and doctrine. If Postmodernism has done anything for the study of religion, it is in urging the end of the historicist project that locates truth—or perhaps accuracy—in the intention of the founder or the precise words of the sacred text.

But because many of the dilemmas we confront in understanding religion belong to historicism, it is significant to approach the problem in a way that acknowledges the long purchase historical thinking has had on theology. It is relevant, for example, that Jews, Christians, and Muslims are not the first to argue principle that truth is old, and lies (false doctrines, heresy) are new, or that founders are good and interpreters and editors and unannointed readers are evil. It was a basic axiom of Rome and Hellenistic society in deciding which religions to legitimate: *quidquod veritas antiqua est*—truth is old, or more specifically “that which is true is old.” The importance of this axiom is expressed in grudging Roman tolerance of Judaism, as being older than the cults of Rome, and intolerance of Christianity—a “malevolent and unapproved superstition, recently arrived” to borrow from Tacitus. It explains the Christian appropriation of the Hebrew Bible as a foundational text-supporting pillars of the new covenant—as well as the disposition to distinguish the truth of the apostolic teaching from the novelty and corruptions of the heretics, and even why in the seventh century the legitimacy of the Prophet's revelations, though unique, final and unrepeatable, were nonetheless thought to be validated by prior revelations, however unreliable, or ancient holy places such as the Kabbah, however abused by traditional Arab religious practices. We can find this line of argument used repeatedly from Josephus to Seneca to Tertullian and extending from the religious debates of late antiquity to modern efforts to excavate the sayings of Jesus from the traditions about him, or the various "hadith projects" designed to prioritize and catalogue the traditions about the Prophet's sayings, explanations, and rulings on legal matters.

The ancient projects and their modern and postmodern extensions, if they differ in motive, seem to find common ground in the ancient belief, replete with neo-Platonic tremors, that truth falling through time becomes enmeshed in error. And there is a logical price to pay for this belief: to rediscover, to defend or to restore the truth is an act of supreme faith—as it was for the purifying and violent Maccabees of the 2nd century BCE, the heresiologists of Ireneaeus's day, the Muslim armies in their slaughter of the Quraithah Jews, the verbal attacks on the philosophers by Al-Ghazali, the physical attacks of the Church on suspected heretics in the Inquisition, Baruch Goldstein's slaughter of Muslims at the Hebron mosque in 1994, the suicide attacks of militant Muslims against “crusader” targets in New York in 2001. It seems either deceptive or foolish, in the terms of Freud's parable, to argue that the last of these events—that is the suicide attacks of 2001—is not related to other religious acts within and outside the Islamic tradition—that is, that it can be understood simply as the corruption of a uniformly recognized religious principle, closer in character to heresy than a defense of orthodoxy. Not to recognize the act as specifically religious is not to understand the event. Radical purifying movements, as distinct from the hermeneutics of cultic and schismatic groups, historically have remained closer to the textual traditions of their foundation and often guard a low hermeneutical tradition that discourages philosophical reformations and cultural adaptations of the received text. This tendency, it seems to me, explains pacifist-scribal apocalyptic traditions such as those at Khirbet Qumran (the Dead Sea commune) in opposition to the assumed perversion of the priesthood and interpretative traditions of the Jewish intelligentsia, and violent apocalyptic traditions such as Masada; it explains as well some, but not
all, early Christian groups. The apocalyptic dimension of religious violence, is another and broader subject and here we can only allude to its persistence in the book traditions as a powerful spur to action—but action that often residuates in suicide as the violent outcome rather than defensive wars. Apocalyptic after all—the belief that God will intervene violently in history to save a few and condemn the many—is both a form of hope and a form of hopelessness.

Let me repeat that expressions of religious violence are not understandable at all if they cannot be understood as expressions of the specific religious culture from which they emerge. Briefly said, they are expressions of particular histories. Lest this statement be appraised as only a Western view of the proudly and defiantly elusive Islamic religious and legal system, one should regard the 1998 fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden, a statement rich in allusion to the glory of the Arab past and the indefatigability of Arab culture and Islamic religious values. It is relatively late in this remarkable piece of literature that he prescribes violence as the only way to defend the truth:

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All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims. And ulema have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries. This was revealed by Imam Bin-Qadamah in "Al-Mughni," Imam al-Kisa'i in "Al- Bada'i," al-Qurtubi in his interpretation, and the shaykh of al-Islam in his books, where he said, 'As for the militant struggle, it is aimed at defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed. Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life.'
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The lines are drawn with Manichean simplicity between powers of dark and light, in terms strikingly similar to the language used by the ancient Qumran or Dead Sea community and their discussion of the war between the sons of light and the sons of darkness. A similar strain can be seen in the liberal use of primary textual sources by the most famous of the 9/11 hijackers, Muhammad Atta, in the so-called “Doomsday Document,” found in his luggage, and a source of fascination for scholars since its release by the FBI in 2002. In the most learned of recent appraisals, Juan Cole has written in an article for the Yale Center for Genocide Studies, that the document was understood as a psychological prep sheet, by which “the hijackers misused various techniques of Islamic spirituality to achieve a psychological state of mind in which it was possible for them to commit mass murder and their own suicides.” In fact, the document is a pastiche of quotations ranging from Quranic verses to the writings of the Sufi teacher al Ghazali to hadith of prophet concerning the legitimacy of the raid as a way of pursuing political and religious victory. The more interesting portion of the document however is the section entitled “The Last Night” designed to fortify the martyr in a time of doubt. Cole describes it in this way:

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The raiders are directed to “vow to accept death.” The word for ‘vowing to accept,’ tabayu’, is related to the term bay’ah, which means “giving fealty to,” used to describe giving allegiance to a caliph or leader of the Muslim community. It is pledge of loyalty, but instead of being given to the leader of Islam, here it is proffered to death itself. Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna had written, “Always intend to go for Jihad and desire martyrdom. Prepare for it as much as you can.” Then, the document advises, the hijacker must "renew admonition" (tajdid at-tanbih). The reference is to an admonition of the base self (an-nafs), which Muslim mystics saw as the primary impediment to undertaking selfless acts
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of worship. In this document, the carnal self is the enemy of the vow to die, selfishly seeking to hang on to life, and so must be vanquished. Admonishing the self is the way to contain it and remain true to the death vow.

The raider is then directed to shave the extra hair on his body, to perfume himself, and to ritually wash himself. Instruction 2 is merely practical, saying that the raider should know the plan well “from every angle.” Instruction 3 reverts to mindset. The raider must read two chapters of the Koran, “The Spoils” and “Repentance.” He must meditate on their meaning and on the rewards God has promised in them to martyrs. This immersion in key sacred texts is important to attaining the mindset of the martyr, to thinking of oneself as already dead and preparing to receive the delights of divine recompense. “The Spoils” was revealed after the battle of Uhud between the pagan Meccans and the Muslims of Medina in 625, in which a small Muslim force of 700 defeated a much larger attacking army. The general context is thus the Muslim raids on and wars against the Meccans (there were 70 raids and 3 major wars). Uhud came after the Battle of Badr. The Surah of Spoils thus situates-or equates-the Twin Towers and Pentagon raids in Islamic history for the al-Qaeda cult. It mapped the United States onto Pagan Mecca. Both had superior military force and both were extremely wealthy commercial centers."

In the light of the traumatic events of September 2001, historical instruction does not seem especially cathartic, perhaps, but the crassness of well-intentioned pieties following the event has made it virtually impossible to understand the events through the lens of historical discernment and whatever gains were achieved for civil obedience on the home front by the assertion that neither 9/11 nor the American response to it had nothing to do with “Islam,” the targeting of Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria and pari passu Saudi Arabia and Yemen left little room at home that at least certain political leaders saw the struggle in a context not completely different to the extremists, a battle between the children of light and the children of darkness: that is, a resurgent Islam had jogged the historical memory of Post Christian Europe and Crusader America, reminding them that secularism is not an irresistible force in the political world.

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That historical memory includes the following oration: after a long invocation of biblical verses a Roman bishop of the 11th century wound up his sermon as follows:

I, or rather the Lord, beseech you as Christ's heralds to publish this everywhere and to persuade all people of whatever rank everywhere, as their oath, foot-soldiers and knights, poor and rich, to carry aid promptly to those Christians and to destroy that vile race of Arabs, remove it from the lands of our friends and to destroy it utterly, abolishing it from the face of the earth. I say this to those who are present, it is meant also for those who are absent. Moreover, Christ commands it. All who die by the way, whether by land or by sea, or in battle against the pagans, shall have immediate remission of sins. This I grant them through the power of God with which I am invested. O what a disgrace if such a despised and base race, which worships demons, should conquer a people which has the faith of omnipotent God and is made glorious with the name of Christ! With what
reproaches will the Lord overwhelm us if you do not aid those who, with us, profess the Christian religion!

The voice of course is distant—Urban II in preaching before the first crusade, and the motives like the modern thirst for oil, not altogether religious; but the intentionality seems clear enough—a sacred and exclusive text authorizes violence. “No, Christ commands it.”

The rationale that religious truth is original to a religious community—chiefly through the revelation or instruction of its founder, prophet, and teacher and secondarily in the process of its earliest transmission has as its corollary the belief, variously expressed, that prophecy dies, heresy emerges, the enemies of God (literally, the apostates) stray from the truth and seek the ruin of souls. Given the persistent view in the book traditions—that corruption is the risk truth takes when faith encounters history, the obligation to save the faith by acts of martyrdom (self-directed violence) acts of aggression (outwardly-directed violence) is persistent as well. The situation can be made more extreme when the religions in question are, as it were, cousins fighting over Grandfather’s estate, when the sacred texts have the same general cast of characters, when the real estate to be passed down is essentially the same land parcel. Wills, estates, and patrimony are not, indeed, analogies but the basic terms of a legal framework from which three similar theological systems have emerged. And their attempts to identify truth, historically, have been—to use John Hick’s imperfect nomenclature exclusivistic. One should be careful in using that term to know that Hick and other comparativists using his categories do not believe that all the book traditions are equally “exclusivistic”—Christianity is often identified, at least in its liberal sectors, as a religion “formerly exclusivistic” that has now dropped its ancient claim to possess the way, the truth and the life.

Hick and others however often underestimate the role of memory in the book traditions. The push for inclusivism and interfaith understanding—however nobly intentioned—often misses the point that the generosity of Christian liberalism can be interpreted as slackness, infidelity, moral uncertainty—even atheism by those whose memory has a longer historical purchase. In this respect at least the significant liberalizing trends in philosophy which profoundly shaped the Christian theology of Europe was also successful in erasing much of the cultural memory that had guaranteed Christians a place at the table as a People of the Book. It is stunning to me that insofar as Christianity in its European and American variety is the subject of opprobrium in Islamic polemic, it is not that doctrines like the trinity versus the tawhid of the Godhead are at issue; it is rather the depressing view that Christians have no doctrines left to defend, or rather none they wish to defend energetically, and have left the table. It is almost impossible to imagine the pragmatic religious companionship of the 12th century, that permitted the Jewish physician-philosopher, Maimonides to write, concerning his duties to a Muslim caliph,

My duties to the Sultan are very heavy. I am obliged to visit him every day, early in the morning, Hence, as a rule, every day, in the morning I go to Cairo. Even if nothing unusual happens there, I do not return to Fostat until the afternoon. Then I am famished, but I find the antechambers filled with people, both Jews and Gentiles, nobles and common people, judges and policemen, friends and enemies—a mixed multitude who await the time of my return.

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It is an annoying weakness of many (of the many) recent books on religion and violence that their authors seem to subscribe to a view that the closest analogy to Islamic extremism, as one is prone to call it, is the extremism of Waco, or the followers of the Reverend Jim Jones in Guyana, whose violence was that of a suicide pact cobbled together by desperate souls in the temporary sway of weirdly charismatic leaders, or the random bombing of an abortion clinic, the killing of a Christian missionary nurse in Lebanon. It seems to me highly doubtful that the present state of religious violence globally can be understood by forcing inapposite events into apposition. The sectarian violence of eccentric preachers should not be categorized with a radical populist movement that has many more sympathizers throughout the Islamic world than it has practitioners and theorists. Nor is the question of “positioning” religious violence a matter of creating a hierarchy of “violent religions” and then finding in their doctrines and traditions the sources of human conduct and particular acts of violence.

Positioning the question requires the non-violent to do something that extremists are able to do far better than the generality of Muslims, Christians, and Jews: the task requires the believer to relearn the significance of exclusivism and the mindset that drives it.

Tertullian’s famous dictum—often reiterated by Pope Pius IX, “Outside the church there is no salvation”—may have been innocuous enough in a time when Christians were forbidden to join the Roman army. When the Roman army became Christian, the implications of the maxim for the unconverted were very different. Augustine having failed to persuade a sect of perfectionist Christians to rejoin the North African church finally despairs of rhetoric and advocates the use of the sword. “Kill them or compel them to come into the Church.” Some of the more vicious of the actions ascribed to the early adherents of Islam in the Sunan Abu-Dawud suggest the same mindset towards persuasion:

The Apostle of Allah said: If you gain a victory over the men of Jews, kill them. So Muhayyisah jumped over Shubaybah, a man of the Jewish merchants. He had close relations with them. He then killed him. At that time Huwayyisah (brother of Muhayyisah) had not embraced Islam. He was older than Muhayyisah. When he killed him, Huwayyisah beat him and said: O enemy of Allah, I swear by Allah, you have a good deal of fat in your belly from his property.

The tradition reported here is not very different from this scene recounted from the Hebron, a source of raw religious sentiment particularly because it is the only place in the world where both Jews and Muslims share the same place of worship: the Tomb of the Patriarchs, where Abraham, Jacob and Rebecca are reportedly buried. In February 1994, an American Israeli named Baruch Goldstein walked into the mosque while Muslims were praying during the sacred month of Ramadan and opened fire with his submachine gun. At least 40 worshippers were killed before Goldstein himself was killed by a crowd of over 400 Muslims. In all such incidents, the historical causes of violence seem to have been subsumed by a more general, a visceral license to violence based on traditional antipathies, social inequities, land distribution questions, all conveniently given the label “issues.” Yet land and rightful ownership of it, social distinctions, suspicion of enemies, and the right to revenge and defense are essential, not incidental, to the religious prose and poetry that support the Abrahamic faiths. No teacher among the Taliban, no professor of Judaic studies, and no liberal Anglican bishop wishes to sacrifice the sacred text in the crossfire between literalism and interpretation.

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The question of religious violence is—as the literary critics like to say—multi-valenced. It cannot be first of all a question of images, since images grow out of experience before experience utilizes images as rationales for action. In recent years, it has become a theological project of various theologies to select, invent, or reform images thought to be violent, dehumanizing, or toxic. What we encounter in such programs, is the familiar interpretative conviction with which we began: that religion is good, but some expressions of it better than others, and some expressions not acceptable at all. I am skeptical of these projects not because they are unwittingly rooted in the Absolute of Hegelian idealism—the notion that a religious essence perdures and sloughs off all of its imperfections over time. (The commercial equivalent is the ad for an arthritis medication a few years ago that told us “You’re not getting older you’re getting better.”) According to one school of thought, ritual precedes myth: the violent act is the precursor of the myths and doctrines that explain it—circumcision, sacrifice, the eating of the Lord’s body in communion, the thirst for martyrdom, the latter-day commemorations of martyrs’ deaths at Asherah, the Good Friday liturgy, jihadi’s turned suicides for the ideal of a perfected Islam. The clumping together of the “merely ritualistic” and the actually grotesque may seem unwarranted, even sloppy, because it seems to confuse rationalized acts of violence in ritual form, such as the Eucharist, with actual forms of violence such as martyrdom and suicide. The distinction is not so clear. It is the question that psychologists and anthropologists ranging from Freud to Mary Douglas to Roy Rappaport and René Girard in the twentieth century have posed, but about which the theological establishment has been largely silent. The acknowledgement of exclusivism alerts us to the fact that religion has never been nonviolent, in essence or manifestation. The work of cultural anthropologists and philosophers, ranging from Braudel to Rene Girard, Konrad Lorenz and theologians like Robert Hammerton Kelley have effectively leaked into the work of church historians, biblical scholars, and exegetes to the extent that it is no longer possible to deny the radical significance of violence as a constituent part of monotheistic tradition: Simply put, violence is part of the human experience. Violence is fundamental, perhaps the defining element of social, religious, and cultural development. Hammerton-Kelly puts it succinctly: “The one thing that cannot be denied is that violence is ubiquitous and tenacious and must be accounted for if we are to understand humanity.”

The sacrificial systems of ancient Israel, the apodictic doctrine of blood for blood, the apocalyptic vision of a John the Baptist, the martyrdom cults of ancient Christianity, the jihadist posture of the Muslim armies, the readiness to identify Holy Land and Holy People with one’s homeland and closest kin, the doctrines of the eschaton—judgement, paradise, or everlasting torture, the bifurcation of the cosmos into a faithful brotherhood and reprobate majority, and the entirety of the images these evoke in the sacred writings of the Abrahamic traditions are violent, either directly in what they denote, or in the connative sense for modes of conduct they describe. To say this is not the same as asking the question “How do religions become violent?” or “Why are some religions more violent than others?” but to confront in religious texts and traditions the story of human experience.

Attempts to hierchize religious violence seem, of course, as naïve as the pacific attempts to persuade a world now witnessing new holy wars that violence is aberrational or exceptional. Similarly, attempts to chronologize the question—Judaism and Christianity used to be violent, Islam still is—is a statement about the purchase of belief on ordinary lives in the modern era, not a statement about the nature of Christianity and Judaism.

Should we grant that the theories of social anthropology concerning the nature and origin of religion are offset by the “good they do” by virtue of being mature versions of what they once were? Perhaps. It was Augustine who argued, in his usual forceful way, that the child is the damned prototype of a being whose conduct would be universally condemned if it became the
behavior of the mature human person: selfish, willful, disobedient—more like Cain than Adam. Are religions naturally violent in the way a baby is naturally but incompetently violent: is it the nature of religion to outgrow its violent infancy? Or is it as Freud argued the nature of religion to sustain us in a delusional state of selfish infancy where violence is always possible? Must we see the Augustinian and Freudian as opposites, since the adult state is not a steady state of maturity but always threatens to devolve into a state of whining self-love and aggressive self-protection? As J. D. Weaver suggested in a 2001 essay in the journal *Crosscurrents*, even a thoroughly rationalized article of faith—the Christian doctrine of the atonement—depends on the startling idea that God not only permitted but also somehow "required" the death of his own Son, and in making this its core belief, Christianity inadvertently presented to the world an image of God as an abusive parent. If a central doctrine can be assessed in this way, how much more obvious the implications of Jeremiah 20.7, the prophet talking about his experiences of revelation beginning at the age of nine: "O Lord thou hast seduced me and I am seduced; Thou hast raped me and I am filled up." In looking at doctrines, texts, myths and images, we are looking at what religion says about itself, and it seems, again, deceptive or foolish, to suggest that that the true character of a religion can only be found in the correction of its self-expression.8

Catherine Madsen, in her interpretation of a poem by John Hollander offers the following—first the poem, called "The Mad Potter," and then her appraisal:

The half-formed cup cries out in agony,
The lump of clay suffers a silent pain.
I heard the cup, though, full of feeling, say,
"O clay be true, O clay keep constant to
Your need to take, again and once again,
This pounding from your mad creator who
Only stops hurting when he's hurting you."
—John Hollander, "The Mad Potter"

The violent God is not an image of our aspirations; he is an image of what happens when we fail. The Bible is not a blueprint for the ideal relationship between God and humanity, but a profound psychological portrait of a relationship that has been wretched from the start. A woman can walk away from a violent husband (sometimes, but not always, with the hope of escaping him), but we cannot leave the universe; there is no divorce from God. And here—in the least feminist, indeed the least ethical of situations, the one in which there is no choice—the terms of the problem become clear. A metaphor for God is not a preventative or a remedy. It may be a record of the irremediable: a marker for a disaster that has already happened, a pain for which there was no preventative, a wound for which there was no medicine. God is not the cure but the disease.9

Yet powerful as her image is, Madsen misses the point that religious texts do not try to disguise the "wretchedness" of the relationship: they alert us to it. The Christian doctrine of the atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ is startling because it is startling that a violent act can be an expression of love, or perhaps more to the point: that sacrifice has merit. Theologically easy as this may be for the Christian to appropriate by custom, does he feel that the Martyrs of Palestine in the time of Eusebius have anything in common with the martyrs of Palestine today? When is violent death an expression of divine love and favor, and when is it not?
It seems then that the question about religious violence is really a question about the inherentism of violence to any consistent idea about God, a view that penetrates the three faiths here being discussed: God is creator, God is Judge, God is merciful, God rewards, God saves, God slays our enemies, God's punishes. In the particular traditions, God also reveals, commands, inspires, leads (as a general), and orders. Eliot asked in the Four Quartets whether the worship of this God means we must "Die of the absolute paternal care / That will not leave us, but prevents us everywhere"

The inherentism of religious violence describes or positions (it does not answer) the question we are wanting to ask: It is not really whether religion promotes violence, nor whether particular traditions are more violent than others; nor even whether some images of God are good for us and some toxic—that seems to me a jejune way to put the question—The question rather, is what one is to do with the recognition that to the extent religion is not violent, it means a curbing of religion's natural symbolic appetite for images of the violent, for violent action—for war, capital punishment and revenge against one's enemies—by suppression, erasure, or simply disbelief.

3 Ibid.
4 Thatcher, O., Sourcebook for Medieval History (New York: Scribners, 1905), 513-515.
6 Sunan abu-Dawud, bk. 19, no. 2998.